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CONCLUSION
The present Ohio Professional Association Law obviously represents a
first and very important step in obtaining the tax benefits of qualified
pension and profit-sharing plans for professional men. There are a
number of technical corporate problems to be corrected by the legislature.
The special problems of attorneys, and perhaps of other professions, will
require further action by other governmental agencies before the profes-
sional association will be a useful vehicle. Serious consideration also
will have to be given to the benefits to be derived from establishing a
qualified plan, how it will affect the organization, who will share in bene-
fits, the cost of the plan and the like. The Internal Revenue Service is
proceeding with deliberation9' and probably it will be some time before
the Service approves any plans for associations and corporations formed
under the new state laws.9" In these unsettled circumstances one must
consider and evaluate most carefully the many factors involved before
recommending that a professional organization incorporate under the new
law.
SOME TAX PROBLEMS OF A PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION
Donald C. Alexander
TRANSFER OF PRACTICE TO ASSOCIATION
The decision to create a professional association for the conduct of a
partnership practice must be implemented by transferring the practice to
the association. Such transfer presents tax problems as well as oppor-
tunities for tax savings.
Of course, it is clear that the incorporation of a partnership enter-
prise is, without other complicating factors, a tax-free transaction.1 If
the transaction is used, however, as a means of making a gift or of paying
compensation, the protective umbrella of section 351 does not extend so
far as to prevent recognition of its true tax nature.'
91. The procedure outlined in Revenue Procedure, 61-11, 1961-1 CuM. BULL. 897, requires
a complete review of the question of the organization's status at both the local office and the
national office of the Internal Revenue Service before the plan can be considered for approval
by the local office.
92. Professor Boris Bittker in a recent article, Professional Associations and Federal Income
Taxation: Some Comments and Questions, 17 TAx L. REV. 1, 33 (1961), argues that the
Treasury would do well to delay ruling on the association or corporate status of professional
organizations formed under the new laws until there has been developed a body of state law
determining the legal consequences attendant upon such organizations.
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Accounts Receivable
An initial question arises with respect to receivables due the partner-
ship at the time of incorporation. Can such receivables be transferred to
the association without the realization of income?3 Accounts receivable
of a cash-basis partnership constitute "unrealized receivables" ,under sec-
tion 751 (c) of the Code and a sale or exchange of a partnership interest
attributable to such receivables or a disproportionate distribution involv-
ing them is a taxable transaction.' On the other hand, if section 351
applies, as will usually be the case, to prevent the recognition of gain or
loss on the transfer, the partnership provisions should not require a tax
upon the transfer of receivables to the new professional association, pro-
vided such association reports the income from such receivables as they
are collected.5
Obviously, this is not the complete answer. To the extent that the
receivables relate to services performed by the partnership, it seems that
income of the two entities, partnership and association, is most accurately
reflected by having the partnership report the income from the receiv-
ables arising by reason of services rendered by it.' On the other hand,
Thomas W. Briggs7 offers direct Tax Court authority that a cash-basis
transferor does not have to pay the tax on service fees transferred prior
to collection to a corporation organized to take over the enterprise. Con-
servative practitioners may hesitate to rely on the Briggs case, however,
for the possible application of section 45 (now section 482) was not
raised until the government briefed the case.8 It is not surprising to find
a reluctance on the part of the Internal Revenue Service to give advance
rulings on this issue.9
1. INT. 1Ev. CODE OF 1954 S 351 [hereinafter cited as CODE fl; SI. 3748, IV-2 CUB.
BULL. 17 (1925); G.C.M. 11557, XII-I CuM. BULL. 128 (1933). For a general discussion
of the incorporation of a partnership, see Paul & Kalish, Transition From a Partnership to a
Corporation, N.Y.U. 18TH INST. ON FED. TAX 639 (1960).
2. CODE § 351, Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(b) (1955) [hereinafter cited as Reg. f]. Further-
more, if over twenty per cent of the stock is given for services - past, present, or future -
the transaction does not qualify as tax free. CODE § 351 (a).
3. Since professional partnerships and associations will normally report income on the cash
basis, it is assumed in the following discussion that this will be the case.
4. CODE §§ 731, 741, 751. For a discussion of the complexities of section 751, see Alexan-
der, Collapsible Partnerships, N.Y.U. 19TH INST. ON FED. TAX 257 (1961).
5. For a case under prior law treating a contingent fee arrangement as resulting in the trans-
fer of an equitable interest in property, see The Roberts Co., 5 T.C. 1 (1945), acq., 1945
CuM. BULL. 6.
6. See CODE § 482.
7. 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 440 (1956). See also P. A. Birren & Son, Inc. v. Commissioner,
116 F.2d 718 (7th Cir. 1940). But cf. H. Lewis Brown, 40 B.T.A. 565 (1939), aff'd, 115
F.2d 337 (2d Cir. 1940); Palmer v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1959).
8. 15 CCII Tax Ct. Mem. at 451. Possibly the Commissioner might take the other attack
of disallowing expense deductions relating to the transferred income. Cf. South Lake Farms,
Inc., 36 T.C. No 106 (Sept. 15, 1961).
9. Points to Remember No. 7, A.B.A. SEC. OF TAX. BULL. (October, 1961), p. 67.
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Of course, it is not necessary to transfer receivables to the new as-
sociation, and many partnerships may prefer, without regard to tax con-
siderations, to let the old entity receive them. To assist in solving practi-
cal problems of collection, the association could act as agent for the
partnership in such activities.'
As a final word on incorporation, the adverse tax consequences of
having the new corporation continue partnership drawing accounts is il-
lustrated by a recent case in the Eighth Circuit." If the transfer of part-
nership assets is to be made, in part, for obligations of the association,
one must be careful to qualify such obligations as securities' 2
TAX CONSIDERATIONS AFTER INCORPORATION
Accounting Period
A further question to be decided upon soon after the formation of
an association is its choice of accounting period.'3 Under section 441
of the Code and the applicable Regulations 4 a new corporation (or
entity taxable as such) has the right to select a taxable year, and unlike
a partnership, the corporation need not use the same period as that em-
ployed by its members.' 5 The members of an association succeeding to
the practice of a calendar-year partnership may thus secure a fairly sub-
stantial one-shot saving through adopting a fiscal year ending fairly early
within the first calendar year after incorporation, whether or not they
make an election to be taxed as a partnership. Of course, any such sav-
ings will be materially reduced if it is necessary for the association to pay
large current salaries to its members.
On the other hand, the members of a partnership with a fiscal year
ending early in the calendar year are faced with a serious problem of
bunching or doubling of income in the year the partnership becomes an
association.' Irrespective of whether the association elects to be taxable
as a partnership, income passed through during the calendar year to the
members of the new association will be added to their shares of partner-
ship income for the final fiscal year.' Thus the progressive tax rates
10. See Eber, The Pros and Cons of the New Professional Service Corporations, 15 J. TAXA-
TION 308 (1961).
11. Harrison v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 587 (8th Cir. 1956).
12. For a discussion of what is included within the term "securities," see 3 MERTENS, FED-
ERAL INCOME TAXATION § 20. 67 (1957).
13. As shown below, in certain instances the switch from partnership to association should
be timed with this factor in mind.
14. Reg. § 1.441-1(b) (3) (1957).
15. Cf. CODE § 706(b); Reg. § 1.706-1(b) (1956).
16. It is assumed that all members use the calendar year, as will usually be the case.
17. The problem of electing under Subchapter S to be taxable as a partnership is discussed
on pp. 222-23 infra.
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may well produce a substantial wastage of income in the initial year, and,
if possible, salaries should be held to a reasonable minimum during this
period so that the adverse effect of bunching may be avoided. In the
meantime, the stockholder-employees have to eat, but it may be suggested
to those lucky enough to have a reservoir of capital that a dollar of prin-
cipal (or a dollar borrowed from the bank) buys as much as a dollar of
income. 8 If principal or outside loans are not available, a solution may
be sought through the judicious making of loans or withdrawals from
the association, with repayment made later through salary credits. Al-
though this solution may be frequently used, it is not ideal; careful plan-
ning is necessary to prevent the loans from being classified as dividend
distributions when made.'
Reasonable Salaries
Professionals who turn their partnerships into associations may be
unhappily surprised to find a double tax upon amounts paid to them ex-
ceeding "a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for
personal services actually rendered."2  In other words, payments to
member-owners of a professional association in excess of reasonable com-
pensation will be treated as dividends taxable to the recipient but non-
deductible by the association.
At first glance, this does not look like a difficult problem. Why
shouldn't the members of a professional association continue to draw the
same substantial compensation they received as partners and why aren't
these payments deductible? Analysis unfortunately demonstrates, how-
ever, that the solution is not so easy.2 Partnership distributions take into
account not only the services, including supervisory work, rendered by
the particular individual but also his share of income, earned and un-
earned, engendered by all the activities and investments of the partner-
18. Although a member of such a group might try to solve his problem, to some extent
at least, by changing his own accounting period, any effective change would require consent
of the Commissioner. CODE § 442. That the Commissioner may be slow to grant consent is
demonstrated by the following: "If the effect of the change is to defer a substantial portion
of the taxpayer's income, or to shift a substantial portion of deductions, from one year to
another so as to reduce substantially the tax liability of the taxpayer, the change will ordinarily
not be approved." Reg. § 1.442-1 (b) (1) (1957). Taking advantage of the special dispensation
allowed newly married couples may be impossible for some and too drastic a step for others.
Reg. § 1.442-1(e) (1959).
19. Cf. Spheeris v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 944
(1961); Regensburg v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
783 (1944); William C. Baird, 25 T.C. 387 (1955).
20. CODE § 162(a) (1).
21. At least one author states somewhat optimistically: "However, it is felt that there should
be no problem in distributing substantially all of the earnings of an incorporated medical associa-
tion .... " Stichter, Tax Favored Profit-Sharing and Pension Plans Made Possible for Ohio
Physicians by S.B. 550, 57 OHIO ST. MED. J. 1152, 1157 (1961).
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ship.22 Therefore, conservative tax practitioners will likely agree with
the statement of Chief Judge Jones of the Court of Claims that "It is un-
certain to what extent the share of a partner in the profits of a partner-
ship may be compared to the salary of a corporation employee who is also
a large stockholder in the corporation." 3
It is somewhat surprising to find that there is judicial guidance for
determining how much compensation is too much for physicians and
surgeons. A leading case is Klamath Medical Service Bureau v. Com-
missioner," involving an Oregon corporation which was engaged pri-
marily in selling and servicing prepaid medical, surgical, and hospital
plans but also owned two hospitals and a hotel. The taxpayer paid its
member-physicians more than 100 per cent of their gross billings in the
years in question. Although the taxpayer's fee schedule and thus its
billings were quite low compared to fees charged by other doctors for
similar services, the Ninth Circuit upheld the finding of the Tax Court
that amounts in excess of 100 per cent of the billings of the members
were non-deductible distributions of corporate income. In rejecting help-
ful considerations for the taxpayer like the fact that the payments in ques-
tion were not in proportion to stock ownership, the court approved argu-
ments of the government that some of the income paid to the doctors
came from other than professional services and that the contracts with
the doctors were ambiguous and apparently did not require the organiza-
tion to pay them more than 100 per cent of their base fees.
In a later decision, the Tax Court followed the Klamath holding, but
added an interesting modification.25 All the stock of the McClung Hos-
pital, Inc., which operated a West Virginia hospital, was owned by an
elderly and relatively inactive doctor and his two sons, also doctors. Dur-
ing the years in question, the older man, who rendered only part-time
services, received five per cent of the taxpayer's gross receipts, and the
two younger stockholder-doctors were paid an aggregate of their entire
billings, one more than his individual billings and one less. Non-share-
holder doctors received only sixty per cent of fees attributable to their
services. Judge Train found that the compensation to the older doctor
in excess of $100 a week was unreasonable, but he allowed a deduction
for the full amounts paid the two younger men. In reaching this result,
he rejected the government's argument that the amounts paid to the
younger doctors should be reduced by overhead expenses and uncollect-
ible accounts, as well as the contention that the test of 100 per cent of
billings should be applied individually rather than to aggregate billings
22. CODE §§ 701-02.
23. Irby Constr. Co. v. United States, 290 F.2d 824, 826-7 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
24. 261 F.2d 842 (9th Cit. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 966 (1959).
25. McClung Hosp., Inc., 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 449 (1960).
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of both stockholder-doctors. Adding the McClung holding to Klamath,
one can reach a quick and rather easy conclusion that 100 per cent of
stockholder billings is fine, but anything more creates trouble.2 6
Applying the rule (if two cases establish a rule) of Klamath and
McClung to a particular association may not prove troublesome if either
(1) substantially all the revenues of the association are derived from the
professional services of the members, or (2) if not, the members are
content with compensation not exceeding the billings for their services.
If the association realizes income from the services of non-members or
from equipment or other income-producing property, and the members
want to distribute all or substantially all the profits, a question of un-
reasonable compensation may well arise."
Certain professional groups derive a substantial portion of their reve-
nues from the services of technicians and assistants who are not eligible
to be members, and the Service might well take the position that the
payment, as compensation, of profits arising from the services of such
people is beyond the permissible limit except to the extent that it repre-
sents the value of supervisory services rendered by the members in direct-
ing their work. If the professional association derives income from prop-
erty - whether such income arises from the use of costly medical or
dental equipment or from investment properties as in Klamath - pay-
ments of compensation attributable to such "passive" revenue may be
reasonable only to the extent of a fair charge for managerial services.
The problem becomes greater if the profits of the association are paid to
members in substantially the same proportion as their stock ownership,
as will frequently be the case 2
As mentioned below, the Service appears to require written employ-
ment contracts between the professional practitioners and the association
as a condition to granting a ruling." Even without regard to this, it
seems advisable to have such formal contracts. The wording of these
agreements is quite important, not only in establishing the necessary em-
ployer-employee relationship,"° but also in securing a deduction at the
corporate level for amounts paid as compensation to the members." It
26. One can reach the further conclusion that the professional association should maintain
records showing individual billings. But see the discussion below of possible personal hold-
ing company problems if there is too much emphasis on the individual and too little on the
group.
27. Of course, an election under section 1371 of the Code to be taxable as a partnership
should go far toward solving this problem, but may well likely create others. This is dis-
-cussed pp. 222-24 infra.
28. See Reg. §5 1.162-7, 1.162-8 (1958).
29. See Rev. Proc. 61-11 § 4.01, 1961-1 CuM. BULL. 897.
30. This problem is discussed pp. 225-27 infra.
31. Also, the wording of these contracts can have an important bearing on whether the or-
ganization meets the tests for qualification as an association under the new Regulations. For
example, one should guard against inserting protective provisions reserving managerial powers
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is basic, of course, that compensation, particularly if contingent, must be
designated as such32 and that the contracts should, if possible, expressly
obligate the association to pay the amounts in question."u Also, the con-
tract should place the horse ahead of the cart; the amount retained by the
association should depend, inter alia, upon the amount paid out as com-
pensation, not vice versa. 4
The basic question, of course, is whether the compensation paid is
reasonable, and this turns on the particular facts of the individual case.85
The situation may be particularly troublesome if all the association's in-
come is distributed as compensation. Although there is authority to the
effect that the distribution of all the profits of a corporation to three offi-
cers, including the two who owned all its stock, was not unreasonable,
the circumstances of this case are so unusual that little reliance can be
placed upon it. 8
One must also remember that contributions made for a stockholder-
employee under a pension or profit-sharing plan are taken into account in
determining whether his aggregate compensation is reasonable."1 Internal
Revenue Service agents examining retirement plans are aware of this
requirement, and they are unlikely to overlook it when reviewing plans
created by professional associations.
Problems With Respect to Accumulation of Income
Accumulated Earnings Tax
One of the benefits of conducting a professional practice through an
organization taxable as a corporation is the right to accumulate income
at the relatively low corporate tax rate of thirty per cent on the first
to all the members, for the corporate attribute of centralized management, as defined in the
Regulations, would not be present if each of the employee-stockholders had a veto power over
the significant business decisions of the association. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (c) (1960).
32. For a case illustrating the unfortunate consequences of a failure to make clear that auto-
mobiles bought for stockholder-officers were intended as compensation and not as dividends,
see Annabelle Candy Co., CCH 1961 TAX CT. REP. (20 CCH Tax Ct. Mere.) Dec. 24889
(June 12, 1961).
33. What may happen if this is not done is illustrated by Klamath Medical Service Bureau
v. Commissioner, 261 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 966 (1959).
34. Ibid.
35. Some justifications for large salaries are stated in Wolper, Medical Entities Taxed as
Corporations: A New Field, 15 C.L.U. JOURNAL 353, 361-62 (1961). For a listing of the
basic factors involved, see 4 MERTENs FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 25.69 (1960).
Helpful compilations of cases are found in 7 CCH 1961 STAND. FED. TAX. REP. g 8926
(Sept. 13, 1961); Wolder, How the Tax Court Treats Reasonable Compensation, 39 TAXEs
473 (1961).
36. Austin v. United States, 28 F.2d 677 (5th Cit. 1928); see Idaho Livestock Auction, Inc.
v. United States, 187 F. Supp. 875 (D. Idaho 1960).
37. Reg. § 1.404 (a)-1 (b) (1956).
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$25,000.38 A further advantage is the dividends received deduction,
which has the effect of making the corporate tax rate on dividends only
4.5 per cent if taxable income is less than $25,000 and 7.8 per cent if
more. 9 Some associations of professional people will want to take ad-
vantage of this right to store up income at small tax cost, with the various
benefits available through such accumulations.4"
Under present law, an association taxable as a corporation can accumu-
late $100,000 of earnings before any problem can arise with respect to
unreasonable accumulation of earnings.41 After the $100,000 figure is
reached, it may well be difficult, in the ordinary situation, for the associa-
tion to justify further substantial accumulations. Usually little capital is
needed to conduct a professional practice, and unless the organization is
unusually large or has unusually heavy demands for working capital,
accumulations beyond $100,000 may well be questioned as unreasonable.
Present law permits retention, however, to meet the "reasonably antici-
pated needs" of the business." Certainly, accumulations to buy expensive
medical equipment needed for the present or future practice of the associa-
tion should be permissible.43
Also, presumably an association could store up funds to acquire a
building in which its practice could be conducted, and perhaps other in-
vestments in bricks and mortar could be justified, if permitted by state
law,44 but accumulations beyond $100,000 to buy investments having
little relation to the practice of the association would be dangerous. Ac-
cumulations to implement a buy-sell arrangement were given a great boost
in the recent Mountain State Steel Foundries45 case, and the Second Circuit
opinion in Gsell" restores to the law a provision which the Tax Court
sought, in effect, to eliminate - section 534 which places the burden of
proof upon the Commissioner with respect to the issue whether earnings
have been accumulated beyond the reasonable needs of the business, if
38. CODE 5 11(b).
39. CODE 5 243.
40. Uses (particularly insurance) for accumulated income are discussed at length in Wolper,
Medical Entities Taxed as Corporations: A New Field, 15 C.L.U. Journal 353 (1961).
41. CODE §5 531, 535(c) (2).
42. CODE 5 537. The Regulations take a very narrow view of what is a reasonably antid-
pated need. Reg. § 1.537-1 (1959).
43. Cf. California Motor Transp. Co., 12 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 605 (1943); Eber, The Pros
and Cons of the New Professional Service Corporations, 15 J. TAXATION 308, 310 (1961).
44. In the Klamath case, 261 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1958), the taxpayer had acquired two
hospitals and a hotel.
45. 284 F.2d 737 (4th Cir. 1960). See also Emeloid Co. v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 230
(3d Cir. 1951); but compare the surprising case of Pelton Steel Casting Co. v. Commissioner,
251 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1958), where Judge Finnegan, in a sarcastic opinion, held that the
preservation of the independent enterprise was not a valid business purpose. See Armstrong,
Section 531 - Recent Cases Suggest New Problems, 39 TAXES 853 (1961).
46. R. Gsell & Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 321 (2d Cir. 1961); see also Young Motor
Co. v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 488 (1st Cir. 1960).
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the taxpayer files a sufficient statement of the grounds on which it re-
lies.4
7
Personal Holding Company
A further problem in this field is whether the association can accumu-
late income without running afoul of the confiscatory taxes applicable to
personal holding companies.48  A dual test must be satisfied for an or-
ganization to be classified as a personal holding company; not only must
at least eighty per cent of the total gross income of the association for
the year be personal holding company income, as discussed below, but
also at some time during the last half of the taxable year more than fifty
per cent of the value of the outstanding stock must be owned, directly or
indirectly, by or for not more than five individuals. 49 Broad constructive
ownership rules apply in determining whether the requirement relating to
ownership of stock is met."
Small professional associations or large associations controlled by a
single family will probably meet the stock ownership test for personal
holding company classification. On the other hand, the income test is
much less likely to be satisfied. While personal holding company in-
come includes, inter alia, dividends, interest, royalties, rents (unless more
than fifty per cent of gross income) and gain from transactions in stock
and securities," one would hardly expect these categories of nonoperating
income to make up eighty per cent of the total gross income of a pro-
fessional association. The difficulty arises, however, by reason of the in-
clusion in personal holding company income of certain amounts received
under "personal service contracts," and in this connection the exact word-
ing of the statutory description is of great significance:
Amounts received under a contract under which the corporation is to
furnish personal services; if some person other than the corporation has
the right to designate (by name or by description) the individual who
is to perform the services, or if the individual who is to perform the
services is designated (by name or by description) in the contract ... s
Receipts under such contracts are included in personal holding company
income if at least twenty-five per cent of the stock of the association is
47. CODE § 534(c). This shift in burden applies only to cases in the Tax Court. keg. §
1.533-1 (b) (1960).
48. The tax rate on the accumulated income of a personal holding company is seventy-five
per cent on the first $2,000 and eighty-five per cent on the excess. CODE § 541.
49. CODE § 542(a). Various types of corporations are excluded from personal holding
company classification, but none of these exclusions seem applicable to professional associations.
CODE § 542(c).
50. CoDE § 54 4(a).
51. CoDE § 543(a).
52. CoDE § 543(a) (5) (A).
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owned, at some time during the taxable year, by or for the individual
performing the services in question.
Is the above provision applicable to a professional association? A
reading of the Senate Finance Committee report on the Revenue Act of
1937, which brought this provision into the law, indicates dearly that
the new subsection was aimed at the practice of incorporating talent, not
at the type of operation to be carried on by professional associations:
The provision that some third party must have the right to designate
who shall perform the services contracted for, or that the person to per-
form the services must be designated in the contract, will prevent this
rule from applying in general to operating corporations engaged pri-
marily in rendering personal services and which necessarily enter con-
tracts to render such services, selecting such members of their staff as
they desire to render such services. Thus, corporations which let out
the services of architects, engineers, and advertisers would not as a
general rule be required to report such income as personal holding com-
pany income. It is believed that the proposed amendment will take
care of the "incorporated talent" loophole.53
Current regulations under this statutory provision contain an example,
involving a contract to render engineering services, which bears out the
view expressed above.54 Although there is little authority under section
543 (a) (5), a helpful discussion is found in Revenue Ruling 59-172,5'
holding that commissions received by a small fire and casualty insurance
agency under agreements with various insurers are not personal holding
company income since (1) no individuals were named in the contracts
and (2) additional licensed agents could be employed in the future to
perform the selling services then carried on by the two agents owning
all the stock of the corporation. Through an examination of the cases
construing this provision, one can draw a fairly distinct line between con-
tracts which escape the label of personal service contracts and those
which do not.5
By implication, both the statute and the Regulations seem to require
a written contract, which will rarely be made, by, say, a professional
association engaged in the practice of medicine. On the other hand,
there is no express limitation in the statute or the Regulations restricting
the application of this provision to situations involving written contracts.
Accepting a somewhat strained extension of the provision regarding in-
53. S. R P. No. 1242, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1937). The report of the Committee on
Ways and Means contains identical language. I-LR. REp. No. 1546, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6
(1937).
54. Reg. § 1.543-1(b) (8) (iii) Example 3 (1958).
55. 1959-1 Cum. BuLL. 144. This ruling distinguished Revenue Ruling 54-53, 1954-1 Cum.
BULL. 175, in which the individual agents were named in the agency contract assigned to
their corporation.
56. Allen Mach. Corp., 31 T.C. 441 (1958), acq., 1959-1 Cum. BULL. 3; Able Metal Prods.,
Inc., 32 T.C. 1149 (1959); General Management Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 882 (7th
Cir. 1943).
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come from personal service contracts to instances where no written con-
tract is made, it remains clear that there must be, at least a contract of
some nature. Does the physician-patient relationship create or result in an
implied contract? In Ohio, as in most other states, this seems to be the
case.
57
Applying further guesswork to medical associations, the method
of operation of the particular entity may be of considerable importance.
In other words, if the patient seeks aid from the association rather than
any of the doctors employed by it and the association has the sole right
to assign a particular doctor or several doctors to care for the patient,
the patient would not have the required right of designation. On the
other hand, if a patient selects a doctor from the group employed by the
association, and the other doctors do not perform services for such pa-
tient, a personal holding company problem might possibly arise. While
under section 543 (a) (5) the association, not the particular doctor, must
render the services pursuant to the contract, presumably all professional
services of members are rendered through the association.5"
One should not forget that even if the patient is considered as desig-
nating or having the right to designate the particular physician to per-
form services under a contract, the resulting income is untainted unless
such physician owns, directly or indirectly, at least twenty-five per cent
of the stock. Therefore, if an organization is owned in equal shares by
five unrelated doctors, the income from their services will not be personal
holding company income, irrespective of how their practice is conducted.
Also, if the contract requires "important and essential" services of others
than stockholders having the required percentage interest, the portion of
the income attributable to such services is excluded from the dangerous
category.
59
Election to be Taxed as a Partnership
If a professional association has no more than ten shareholders, it is
eligible to elect to be taxable as a partnership under sections 1371 to
1377 of the Code."°
57. Relevant cases include Craig v. Chambers, 17 Ohio St. 253 (1867); Gillette v. Tucker,
67 Ohio St. 106 (1902); Morningstar v. Jones, 31 Ohio L. Abs. 440 (Ct. App. 1940); Doyle
v. Byers, 5 Ohio L. Abs. 727 (Ct. App. 1927); Broadway v. Jeffers, 194 S.E. 642 (S.C. 1938);
Brown v. Moore, 247 F.2d 711 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 882 (1957). In one well-
reasoned case, however, it was pointed out that the relationship was one of status rather than
of contract. Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N.C. 355, 90 S.E.2d 754 (1956).
58. OHIo REv. CODE § 1785.03.
59. Reg. § 1.543-1(b) (8) (ii) (1958). Incidental personal services do not count, however.
See General Management Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 882 (7th Cir. 1943).
60. CODE § 1371 (a). By reason of the nature of a professional association and the require-
ments of the laws under which it is created, there need be little concern about the other re-
quirements for election. Although a professional association, like any other corporation, would
be disqualified from continuing such election if more than twenty per cent of its gross receipts
[VOL 13:2
Alexander, Professional Association - Tax Problems
Space is not available here to discuss all the advantages, problems and
pitfalls of an election by a professional association to be taxable as a cor-
poration; Subchapter S of the Code has been fully and ably discussed else-
where.61 In general, however, the effect of such election is to tax all the
income of the association to its shareholders, after deductions for contribu-
tions to retirement plans and other fringe-benefit programs. The asso-
ciation itself pays no tax. 2 Thus any concern about the personal hold-
ing company problem or unreasonable accumulation of earnings is elimi-
nated, but the tax benefit of accumulating income in the corporation at
the low thirty per cent rate is also lost. It seems likely that the problem of
unreasonable compensation is also removed, except to the extent it affects
deductions claimed for contributions to retirement plans, but doubts have
been expressed on this point.6" Also, the Commissioner is expressly au-
thorized to reapportion the income of a family group to reflect the
value of services rendered.64
In considering the advisability of making any such election, one should
note that some of the usual advantages of the election should have little
practical meaning to a professional association. For example, it would
be a rare professional group that would sustain a loss which could be
passed through to its shareholders.65 Furthermore, most professional
associations are unlikely to have substantial capital gains as to make a
transmission of such gains to the shareholders a material benefit.66 Also,
Congress has made some tentative gestures toward denying deductions for
contributions to retirement plans and other fringe benefits to electing
corporations, and adverse legislation might some day come to pass in this
field.6r Finally, an election to be taxable as a partnership, after deduc-
tions for retirement plans and other like programs, would highlight and
tend to strengthen a possible argument by the Commissioner that the
retirement program and fringes were the principal reason for the creation
are derived from royalties, rents, dividends, interest, annuities, and sales or exchanges of stock
or securities, such will rarely be the case. Note that income from personal service contracts
is not considered to be personal holding company income disqualifying an election by a small
business corporation. CODE § 1372 (e) (5); Reg. § 1.1372-4(b) (5) (1959).
61. See Patty, Qualification and Disqualification Under Subchapter S; Valentine, Taxation
of Shareholders of Subchapter S Corporations During the Election Period; Stinson, Terminating
the Election Under Subchapter S; Landis, Advantages and Disadvantages of the Subchapter S
Election, in N.Y.U. 18TH INST. ON FED. TAx 661-740 (1960); Goodson, Sheifly & Thomp-
son, Planning With Subchapter S in 1960, U. So. CALIF. 1960 TAx INST. 165.
62. CODE § 1372(b) (1).
63. See Valentine, Taxation of Shareholders of Subchapter S Corporations during the Elec-
tion Period, N.Y.U. 18TH INST. ON FED. TAx 696-97 (1960); cf. Reg. § 1.162-8 (1958).
64. CODE § 1375 (c).
65. CODE § 1374.
66. CODE 5 1375(a); Reg. § 1.1375-1 (1959).
67. E.g., I-.R. 9003, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1959).
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of the association in the first place. In this field, as in others, the election
to be taxable as a partnership should be made with caution. 8
If it is concluded that the advantages of electing outweigh the pitfalls,
one should keep in mind the rules that it is generally desirable for an
electing corporation to pay out all its income and that income not pre-
viously paid out will be taxable to those persons who are shareholders at
the end of the year in proportion to their then interests.69 Thus, an
electing association which has a fiscal year overlapping the calendar year
can provide tax savings to its members by carefully timing its payments
and distributions.
Corporate Entity and Tax Avoidance
It may be contended that the Commissioner can disregard the pro-
fessional association and treat it as a sham for tax purposes. If the asso-
ciation actually carries on a professional practice, and if there is no effort
to split a single enterprise among multiple entities,"m such argument has
little chance of success.
In the first place, the attributes which qualify a professional associa-
tion under the stringent tests of the Regulations71 also satisfy the lesser
requirements laid down in the controlling decisions for the recognition
of the corporate entity. As stated by the Supreme Court,
'Whether the purpose be to gain an advantage under the law of the
state of incorporation or to avoid or to comply with the demands of
creditors or to serve the creator's personal or undisclosed convenience, so
long as that purpose is the equivalent of business activity or is followed
by the carrying on of business by the corporation, the corporation remains
a separate taxable entity.72
If an attack upon a single corporate entity is thus quite unlikely to
succeed, the Commissioner might fall back upon section 269 of the Code,
a weapon which he has used with much recent success. This provision
disallows a deduction if any person or persons acquire control of a
corporation and ". . . the principal purpose for which such acquisition
was made is evasion or avoidance of Federal income tax by securing the
benefit of a deduction, credit or other allowance which such person or
68. For a like view, see Eber, The Pros and Cons of the New Professional Service Corporations,
15 J. TAXATION 308 (1961).
69. CoDE § 1373(b); Reg. § 1.1373-1 (1959).
70. E.g., Advance Mach. Exchange Inc. v. Commissioner, 196 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1952),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 835 (1952); Aldon Homes, Inc., 33 T.C. 582 (1959); Shaw Constr.
Co., 35 T.C. 1102 (1961).
71. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1960).
72. Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 438-39 (1943). See also Na-
tional Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422 (1949); Commissioner v. State-Adams
Corp., 283 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1960); T.V.D. Co., 27 T.C. 879 (1957); but cf. United States
v. Johansson, 62-1 U.S. Tax Cases Cas. 83197 (S.D. Fla. 1961).
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corporation would not otherwise enjoy .... ."" Both the Regulations74
and the decisions75 hold that the creation of a new corporation involves
the acquisition of control within the meaning of section 269.
Therefore, one can visualize the possibility of a claim that the deduc-
tion for contributions to a retirement plan should be denied a professional
association since, according to the Commissioner, the principal purpose
of creating such association was to secure such deduction. Should such
an attack be made, however, the professional association is hardly de-
fenseless. Not only are there certain technical arguments that section 269
has no application here,7" but there is a more basic question. Since Con-
gress has seen fit to tax corporations (and associations) differently from
partnerships, should section 269 be stretched to deny the choice provided
by Congress for bona fide organizations which can qualify as associations?
The answer should be in the negative."
Employer-Employee Relationship
Recognition of the professional association as an entity taxable as a
corporation does not mean that its members are automatically entitled to
coverage under qualified retirement plans and other benefit programs.
Such benefits are available only to employees,7" and it is necessary that the
association and its members establish that their relationship is one of em-
ployer to employee.79
Adopting the old common-law view, the applicable Regulations find
an employer-employee relationship if the person for whom services are
73. CODE § 269 (a).
74. Proposed Reg. § 1.269-3(b), 25 Fed. Reg. 12704 (1960); Reg. 118, § 39.129(b)
(1953).
75. James Realty Co. v. United States, 280 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1960); Coastal Oil Storage
Co. v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1957).
76. Is the deduction for contributions to the retirement plan dependent upon the acquisition
of "control" under section 269? See Commodores Point Terminal Corp., 11 T.C. 411 (1948),
arq., 1949-1 Cum. BULL. 1.
77. See TREASURY DEPARTMENT PUBiCATION No. 334, TAx GUIDE FOR SMALL BUsINESS
10 (1960 ed.), but note the change in the 1962 edition of PUBLICATION No. 334 at 7 in
omitting the sentence stating that the effect of the income tax laws should be borne in mind in
organizing a business. In this respect, the considerable body of authority protecting Western
Hemisphere Trade Corporations against attack under section 269 is directly relevant. A. P. Green
Export Co. v. United States, 284 F.2d 383 (Ct. Cl. 1960); Barber-Greene Americas, 35 T.C.
365 (1960), appeal dismissed, P-H 1961 FED. TAXES 5 56450 (7th Cir. 1961); International
Canadian Corp. v. Frank, P-H 1961 FED. TAXEs (7 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d) 5 61-516 (W.D. Wash.
March 29, 1961); Pan Am. Eutectic Welding Alloys Co., 36 T.C. No. 30 (May 17, 1961);
I. T. 3757, 1945 CUM. BULL. 200.
78. Qualified pension and profit sharing plans, CODE §§ 401-04; Rev. Rul. 61-157, 1961
Int. Rev. Bull. No. 35, at 5; Accident and health plans and sick pay, CODE 5§ 104-06; Death
benefit plans, CODE § 101(b); Group insurance plans, Reg. § 1.61-2(d) (2) (1957).
79. As mentioned below, determining the existence of the employer-employee relationship
is one of the two conditions precedent required by Revenue Procedure 61-11, 1961 INT. REV.
BULL. NO. 18, at 53, for approval of a retirement plan established by a professional association.
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performed "has the right to control and direct the individual who per-
forms the services, not only as to the results to be accomplished by the
work but also as to the details and means by which that result is accom-
pushed.""s  Furthermore, the Regulations also state that physicians, law-
yers, dentists, and others who follow an independent profession are
generally not employees."' Without the gloss put on this strict view by
more liberal court decisions and Service rulings, establishing the required
relationship might be an uphill fight.
In 1956, however, the Tax Court handed down a leading decision in
which it rejected the strict common-law test of control in a situation
involving a physician and instead held that control in such an instance
"must necessarily be more tenuous and general than the control over non-
professional employees." 2 In holding that a pathologist was an employee
of a hospital, Judge Kern thus adopted a more flexible and less difficult
standard, and other courts have taken the same view." In its most recent
statement on the subject, the Internal Revenue Service spelled out a
four-part test for determining whether a physician is an employee, making
employee status depend upon:
(1) the degree to which such individual has become integrated
into the operating organization of the person or firm for which the
services are performed; (2) the substantial nature, regularity, and con-
tinuity of his work for such person or firm; (3) the authority vested
in or reserved by such person or firm to require compliance with its
general policies; and (4) the degree to which the individual under
consideration has been accorded the rights and privileges which such
person or firm has created or established for its employees generally.8
Using the liberal standard established in the Wendell James case and
further refined by the Service, most full-time members of a professional
association should be able to demonstrate, rather easily, that they are em-
ployees. Of course, the employment contracts discussed above should be
so written as to assist in establishing the required relationship. Also,
conservative practitioners will not rely completely on satisfying the four-
part test quoted above but will take into account a possible shift in
80. Reg. § 31.3401(c)-1(b) (1957) (withholding tax regulations); Reg. 5 31.3121(d)-
1(c) (2) (1954) (social security regulations).
81. Reg. § 31.3401(c)-1(c) (1957); Reg. § 31.3121(d)-1(c) (3) (1954).
82. Wendell E. James, 25 T.C. 1296, 1301 (1956).
83. E.g., Flemming v. Huycke, 284 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1960); Walker v. Altmeyer, 137
F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1943).
84. Rev. Rul. 61-178, 1961 INT. REv. BULL. No. 41, at 8, 9. Precisely the same standards
were applied in the only private ruling issued by the National Office of the Internal Revenue
Service, holding that a Connecticut medical clinic qualified under the new Regulations and
its doctor-members were employees. Special Ruling, 7 CCH 1961 STAND. FD. TAX. REP. 5
6375 (March 2, 1961). By quotation out of context, Revenue Ruling 61-178 is misconstrued in
Bittker, Professional Associations and Federal Income Taxation: Some Questions and Com-
ments, 17 TAX L REV. 1, 6 (1961). Mr. Bittker indicates no awareness of the Wendell
James case, although Revenue Ruling 61-178 quotes from it.
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Treasury thinking to protect tax revenues by making it more difficult for
professionals to qualify as employees.85
Even if the Service continues to apply a liberal test of the employer-
employee relationship, it will still be necessary that professionals actually
join together in order to obtain the benefits which they seek from estab-
lishment of an association. Joint conduct of separate practices - com-
bined solely for the purpose, say, of creating a retirement and fringe bene-
fit program and nothing more - is not enough. Furthermore, a split
practice, with only part-time work for the association, introduces an ele-
ment of risk, which can be avoided if the members work substantially
fall time for the association.8"
State Taxation, Workmen's and Unemployment Compensation,
and Extra-Territorial Practice
Ohio" and Connecticut 8 have already ruled that professional as-
sociations formed under their respective laws will be regarded as corpora-
tions for state tax purposes. It seems likely that most other states will
follow this approach. 9
As a consequence, an Ohio professional association will be subject to
incorporation fees9" as well as to the annual franchise tax of three mills
(.3%) 91  On the other hand, professional associations may gain an
Ohio tax advantage over unincorporated entities since investments in
corporate stock owned by the professional association will be exempt
from the Ohio intangible tax.9" It is likely that no significant difference
will arise as a result-of treatment as a corporation instead of as a partner-
ship or other unincorporated entity under the various Ohio municipal in-
85. United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947); Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126(1947); Address by Isidore Goodman, Current Tax Problems in the Pension Trust Field,
New York University Graduate School of Business Administration, October 5, 1961, CCH
PENSION PLAN GUEDE 5 11244 (1961).
86. See Willard Storage Battery Co. v. Carey, 103 F. Supp. 7 (N.D. Ohio 1952), followed
in Rev. Rul. 84, 1953-1 CuM. BULL. 404, but distinguished in Rev. Rul. 61-178, 1961 INT.
Ray. BULL. No. 41, at 8.
87. Bulletin No. 161, Department of Taxation of Ohio (1961).
88. Letter From Connecticut Tax Commission to Commerce Clearing House, Inc., October 17,
1961, CCII PENsIoN PLAN GumEn 5 11279 (1961).
89. But Georgia has taken a different view. P-H GEORGIA STAT TAX SERV. 9 13044.
90. Ohio Code section 111.16 provides for a minimum filing fee of $25 to be paid to the
Secretary of State upon the filing of articles of association. If the number of authorized shares
of the association exceeds 250, the fee is increased.
91. No Ohio Franchise Tax is imposed for the year in which the professional association is
organized. OHno REV. CODE § 5733.16. Thereafter, an annual franchise tax applies to the
professional association. The basis of the tax is defined by Ohio Code section 5733.05 as
".... the total value, as shown by the books of the company, of its capital, surplus, whether
earned or unearned, undivided profits, and reserves.
92. Omo REv. CODE § 5709.02.
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come tax ordinances. Each shareholder, however, will be required to
pay intangible tax upon his interest in the association. 3
The professional shareholders of the association would be counted in
determining whether there are three or more employees for purposes of
the Ohio Workmen's Compensation Act and the Ohio Unemployment
Compensation Act, and compensation paid to them will be taken into
account for such purposes." While few professionals will stand to bene-
fit materially from unemployment compensation, coverage under work-
men's compensation may well be helpful.
Where the services performed by the professional association extend
beyond the borders of its home state, the association will probably be
treated as a corporation for tax purposes in the foreign state. By virtue
of state regulation of the various professions, however, it seems unlikely
that associations will engage in practice beyond their own states. Vir-
tually all jurisdictions prohibit the practice of professions other than by
duly licensed individuals, except for rather limited exceptions. Conse-
quently, a professional association, regarded as a corporation under the
laws of its own state, could probably not be licensed to practice in a for-
eign state. This would be true even where the foreign state had a pro-
fessional association statute unless that statute specifically extended the
privilege of practice as an association to nonresidents.94a
For the present, then, it will probably be necessary for professional
persons licensed in a foreign state to continue any practice in the foreign
state in their individual capacity, and the articles of association should
make provision for this contingency.
TRANSFER OF INTEREST AND TERMINATION
OF THE ASSOCIATION
Switching from a partnership to an association eliminates a host of
problems arising on the sale of a partnership interest.95 To the extent
that state law permits the transfer of interests in a professional associa-
tion, a transfer to a third party is treated as a sale and a transfer to the
association as a redemption, under the rules governing the disposition of
corporate stock. 6 An immediate question is whether the former part-
93. Omo RiV. CODE § 5709.02. The rate of tax is five per cent of the income yield for
productive investments and two mills (.2%) of the true value of nonproductive investments.
Omo REv. CODE §§ 5711.22, 5707.03.
94. OHIo REv. CoDE § 4123.01(A) (2), 4141.01(B) (2).
94a. Cf. OHIO ATmy. GEN. OP. No. 2495, 93 Ohio Dept. Rep. 325 (1961).
95. CODE § 751. This topic is discussed at length in Alexander, Collapsible Partnerships,
N.Y.U. 19TH INST. ON FED. TAX 257 (1961). But this is not a completely unmixed blessing.
See Thrower & Cohen, Professional Associations Under the Georgia Act - Some Tax Aspects
and Consideration of Legal Ethics, 24 GEORGIA B.J. 163, 171 (1961).
96. CODE §§ 1221, 302.
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ners have merely substituted the fire for the frying pan; can a profes-
sional association be a collapsible corporation so as to convert capital gain
into ordinary income on disposition of an interest?"7
Collapsible Corporation Treatment
So far as relevant here, the collapsible corporation provision is ap-
plicable only to corporations "formed or availed of principally for the
manufacture, construction, or production of property.... .," If a profes-
sional association does not manufacture, construct, or produce property,
this dangerous provision should, therefore, be inapplicable."9 Does a
professional association manufacture, construct, or produce anything?
Obviously, a factual inquiry must be made into the specific activities of
the particular association under consideration, bearing in mind that a
corporation is deemed to have produced property, for example, if it en-
gaged in the production of such property "to any extent,"'00 and that the
courts have construed this definitional language quite broadly.'0 ' In-
teresting questions can arise: Does an orthodontist engage in production
or manufacture when he creates braces for his patients? What about a
surgeon who inserts material to replace or strengthen a bone or
organ?0 . If, as indicated in The Roberts Company.. a contingent fee
arrangement may be an interest in property, does obtaining such fee con-
stitute "production"? Could the mere rendition of services in exchange
for an account receivable be the production of property?
If the question of possible collapsibility is not resolved at the outset
by a finding that the association has not engaged in manufacture, con-
struction, or production to any extent whatever, then the advisor must
examine section 341 in all its complexity to determine (1) whether the
other requirements for collapsibility are met and (2) whether any of the
97. CODE § 341.
98. CoDE § 341(b) (1). The inclusion of corporations purchasing inventory property and
of holding companies should have little effect upon professional associations. On the other
hand, a professional association conceivably could be used as the vehicle for the purchase and
indirect disposition within three years of property used in the trade or business such as expen-
sive medical equipment or rental real estate. CODE § 341(b) (3) (D).
99. This is subject, of course, to a caveat in the case of an organization -whose heavy invest-
ments in depreciable property render it subject to the trap described in note 98 supra. But cf.
United States v. Ivey, 294 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1961), which refused to permit the application
of section 341 to convert capital gain into ordinary income.
100. Code § 341(b) (2) (A).
101. Preliminary and relatively inconsequential steps have been regularly held to constitute
construction for purposes of determining collapsibility. Jack Farber, 36 T.C. No. 116 (Sept.
29, 1961), Ellsworth J .Sterner, 32 T.C. 1144 (1959); J. D. Abbott v. Commissioner, 258
1.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1958).
102. Cf. Rev. Rul. 162, 1953-2 CuM. BuLL 127, holding that a blood donation is not a
gift of property but instead is the rendition of a personal service.
103. 5 T.C. 1 (1945), acq., 1945 Cum. BULL. 6.
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various escape clauses apply. Such a review is far beyond the confines
of this article.1"4
Sale of Interest
Sales of interests present an easier problem than redemptions or
liquidations, for, if the collapsible corporation provisions do not apply,
the property sold is ordinarily a capital asset and the sale ordinarily re-
sults in capital gain or loss. On the other hand, a redemption of less
than the professional's entire interest may result in ordinary income if
it does not qualify as a disproportionate distribution,' and complex
attribution rules apply to associations controlled by a related group.0 8
Liquidation
On liquidation of a professional association, a question arises, similar
to that discussed above with respect to the creation of the association,
about the treatment of receivables created by the services of the associa-
tion but not yet taken into income by the taxpayer. The case of Susan
J. Carter... supplies authority for the proposition that on liquidation a
cash-basis corporation must report as income the amounts later collected
by its shareholders from billings resulting from services fully performed
by it.' On the other hand, to tax the association upon the fruit of its
services, one must be certain that the fruit is actually there; a substantial
contingency to payment may produce an opposite result.0 9
In a liquidation of a professional association whose practice is to be
continued,"0 an even more serious question arises. As demonstrated by
the recent Tax Court decision in Merle P. Brooks,"' goodwill of very
substantial proportions may attach to a professional practice, if the suc-
104. For a comprehensive discussion, see Axelrad, Collapsible Corporations and Collapsible
Partnerships, U. So. CALIF. 1960 TAX INsT. 269.
105. CODE § 302(b) (2).
106. CODE §§ 302(c), 318. Since the stock owned by a partner is attributed to the partner-
ship and that of the partnership attributed proportionately to the partner, the presence of a
partnership overlapping the association practice can cause trouble in effectuating a buy-sell
agreement to which the association is a party. CODE § 318 (a) (2) (A); cf. Rev. Rul. 56-103,
1956-1 CuM. BULL. 159.
107. 9 T.C. 364 (1947), aff'd on other grounds, 170 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1948).
108. For analogous authority see Standard Paving Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 330 (10th
Cir. 1951); Jud Plumbing & Heating Inc. v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1946);
United States v. Lynch, 192 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 934 (1952).
109. Cf. Cold Metal Process Co. v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 864 (6th Cir. 1957).
110. In the unlikely event that the practice of the association is not to be continued by any
of its members, it is hard to see, as a practical matter, how goodwill could survive the liquida-
tion. Nevertheless, it could well be argued that value is determined by what the association
possessed immediately prior to dissolution. But cf. Goodman v. Granger, 243 F.2d 264 (3d
Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957).
111. 36 T.C. No. 113 (Sept. 27, 1961). Of the $240,000 purchase price of an orthodontic
practice, $230,000 was paid for good will.
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cess of the enterprise is not dependent upon the skill or services of a par-
ticular individual. This doctrine is now rather firmly imbedded in the
law,. 2 and the Commissioner reluctantly accepted it in a ruling pub-
lished in 1960."' He now may be able to turn this proposition to the
advantage of the revenues by imposing a heavy tax, with no resulting
recovery through depreciation, upon the liquidation of a professional
association.
If the professional association has very little accumulated earnings,
it might seek to solve the goodwill problem by electing to liquidate under
section 333 of the Code, which permits non-recognition of gain on liqui-
dations completed within one calendar month." 4 Looking before leap-
ing is especially important when a one-month liquidation is under con-
sideration; one cannot rely upon a judicial rescue from the trap of an
election based upon an erroneous determination of the absence of
earnings."
5
CLEARANCE FROM INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
In the Internal Revenue Bulletin of May 1, 1961,116 the Service is-
sued Revenue Procedure 61-11 spelling out the procedural rules to be
followed by a professional association which seeks a determination of its
status and clearance of its retirement plan." 7 Under this ruling, as con-
ditions precedent to determining qualification of the retirement plan, the
organization must establish (1) that it is an association taxable as a
corporation and (2) that an employer-employee relationship exists be-
tween it and its associates."'
112. See Rees v. United States, 187 F. Supp. 924 (D. Ore. 1960), affd, P.H. 1961 EDi,. TAxEs
(8 R.2d) 5 61-5777 (9th Cir. 1961) (dental practice) and the following cases finding good-
will upon the sale of an accounting practice: Estate of Masquelette v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d
322 (5th Cit. 1956); Malcolm J. Watson, 35 T.C. 203 (1960); Richard S. Wyler, 14 T.C. 1251
(1950), acq., 1959-2 CuM. BuLL. 7; Rodney B. Horton, 13 T.C. 143 (1959), appeal dis-
missed, 180 F.2d 354 (10th Cir. 1950), acq., 1959-2 CuM. BULL. 5. But cf. O'Rear v. Com-
missioner, 80 F.2d 473 (6th Cir. 1938) (law practice); A.B.A. Committee on Professional
Ethics Opinion No. 300, 47 A.B.A.J. 977 (1961).
113. Rev. Rul. 60-301, 1960-2 Cum. BuLL 15.
114. Accumulated earnings of the liquidated corporation are taxable as a dividend, however,
and gain is recognized to the extent that money, or stock or securities acquired after 1953 are
received by a stockholder and exceed any earnings taxable to him as dividend. CODE
333(e); Reg. § 1.333-4 (1955).
115. Reg. § 1.333-2(b) (1) (1955). Compare Raymond v. United States, 269 F.2d 181
(6th Cir. 1959), and Sam Goldman, 19 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 841 (1950) with Meyer's Estate
v. Commissioner, 200 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1952) and Cockrell v. United States, 1 Am. Fed.
Tax R.2d 394 (N.D. Tex. 1957).
116. In view of the fact that, at the time of this writing, no Rulings have been issued pur-
suant to Revenue Procedure 61-11, the more cynical will consider April 1 to be a more ap-
propriate date.
117. Rev. Proc. 61-11, 1961-1 CUM. BULL. 897.
118. In connection with the latter requirement, Revenue Procedure 61-11 repeated the Service
view, contrary to the holding of the Ninth Circuit in the Kintner case, that no credit can be
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The determination whether an organization is classified as an associa-
tion is made, for all years beginning after December 31, 1960, in accord-
ance with the new Regulations under section 7701 of the Code, but the
more liberal tests of the Regulations under the 1939 Code are apparently
applied for prior years." 9  Organizations in existence on November 17,
1960, the date of the issuance of the final Regulations under Code section
7701, are given the right to amend their articles to meet the new tests,
provided such amendments are made before October 1, 1961. In view
of the fact that this deadline passed without any official word from the
Service applying the general rules of the new Regulations to specific
cases, organizations should be given extra time to amend after they are
told what amendments are necessary. 2 ' It would be extremely unfair
for the Service to enforce its time limit against an organization which
failed to make a timely amendment because of the delays of the Service,
and equity demands application here of the provisions of the relief Regu-
lations lifting time limits in meritorious cases. 2 '
There has been considerable speculation on the question whether an
organization created under one of the new professional corporation or
association laws must qualify under the tests in the new Regulations for
tax treatment as an association. Are such Regulations and Revenue Pro-
cedure 61-11 applicable? For example, the following strong opinions
have been stated:
Neither the Kintner Regulations nor Revenue Procedure 61-11 have any
more application to Professional Corporations than they do to any other
business corporation. It is the writer's considered opinion that tax
advisors should take their state Professional Corporation laws at face
value and expect the IRS to do likewise.1'2
On the other hand, the author of the above statement believes that pro-
fessional associations must satisfy the Regulations.
23
Despite the considered opinion stated above, one may question why
given for prior service in a predecessor partnership. See also Rev. Rul. 61-157, 1961 INT.
REV. BULL. No. 35 at 9.
119. Rev. Proc. 61-11 § 3, 1961-1 CUM. BULL. 897. The prior Regulations are Regulation
118, section 39.3797-1 through 39.3797.6 (1953). An important difference between the old
and new regulations is the treatment of partnership associations. Compare Reg. 118, § 39.3797-6
(1953) with Reg. § 301.7701-3(c) (1960).
120. Since the validity of the new Regulations is open to serious question, and such Regula-
tions are so written as to make compliance very difficult in many situations, some organizations
may prefer to litigate rather than attempt to satisfy the Service.
121. Reg. § 1.9100-1 (1960).
122. Maier, Don't Confuse Kintner-Type Associations With New Professional Corporations,
15 J. TAXATION 248 (1961). Later in his article, Mr. Maier implies that those who pointed
out at the hearing on the proposed regulations that U.P.A. partnerships could not meet the
new tests for associations desired this result. Such was not the case, as anyone present at the
hearing should know.
123. Id. at 249.
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the character of the organization for tax purposes should be determined
by the particular label applied by the state legislature in passing its law.
Is it really this simple? Are professional corporations created under the
acts of Arkansas, Florida, Minnesota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Wis-
consin automatically corporations by reason of their titles, while profes-
sional associations under the laws of Alabama, Connecticut, Georgia,
Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Texas must meet the strict
tests of the Regulations? 4
The Internal Revenue Service has not yet taken an official position
on this question, but conservative practitioners should heed the following
words of Isidore Goodman, Chief of the Pension Trust Branch, Tax
Rulings Division:
Legislation has been enacted in various states recently authorizing
the establishment of professional associations having corporate charac-
teristics. Notwithstanding the classification for local law purposes,
however, in order to constitute the organization an association taxable
as a corporation for Federal tax purposes, it must have sufficient corporate
charactertistics to more nearly resemble a corporation than a partnership.
Mere conformance with state law does not automatically establish such
status. A determination is made on the particular facts in a given case.125
A taxpayer seeking to obtain clearance for his professional association
and its associates under Revenue Procedure 61-11 must file with his local
District Director of Internal Revenue a request for rulings accompanied
by the following documents:
(1) copies of the articles of association or agreement establishing
the organization;
(2) by-laws or code of regulations;
(3) all other data relevant to the formation and operation of the
organization, with the dates of organization and transfer of the profes-
sional practice;
(4) copies of the local law applicable to the organization;
(5) copies of the employment contracts between the organization
and its associates; and
(6) a brief setting forth the position of the organization with
respect to its association status and the employer-employee relationship."2
124. Connecticut also has an old statute permitting the formation of non-stock corporations
to conduct medical clinics. In Connecticut, Tennessee, and Texas the statutory approach was
to amend the Uniform Partnership Act to provide an exception for associations, and thus in
these states, a somewhat more difficult question may arise as to qualification than in the states
expressly creating a new entity (professional association or corporation) governed in genejal
by the corporation law of the state.
125. Address by Isidore Goodman, Current Tax Problems in the Pension Trust Field, New
York University Graduate School of Business Administration, October 5, 1961, CCH PENsION
PLAN GumE S 11244 (1961). Mr. Goodman made reference to Revenue Procedure 61-11
at the end of the quoted paragraph.
126. Rev. Proc. 61-11 § 4.01, 1961-1 CuM. BULL. 897.
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Obviously, there will be a considerable duplication of materials in
multiple filings from the same state; the Treasury will be inundated with
copies of Ohio Senate Bill 550.
The District Director's Office is directed to review the voluminous
materials filed with it and has the authority to hold against the taxpayer
on either the association question or that of employer-employee relation-
ship. Furthermore, Revenue Procedure 61-11 states specifically that the
appeals procedures for National Office review of adverse field determina-
tions with respect to qualification of retirement plans are not applicable,
and, therefore, a taxpayer has no official access to Washington to obtain
review of an unfavorable decision made in the District Director's Office.22
If the District Director's Office does not take a position or believes
that the organization is taxable as a corporation and that the employer-
employee relationship is present, he must forward the case to Washing-
ton with his recommendations "supported by findings of fact and con-
clusions of law."'2" Thus the field office has the authority to deny but
not the right to approve; this one-way street is novel in the field of tax
procedure." In the National Office of the Internal Revenue Service,
the Individual Income Tax Branch of Tax Rulings Division has the
responsibility of ruling on the association question and the Employment
Tax Branch rules on the question of the employer-employee relationship.
In view of the reluctance of the National Office to act in these mat-
ters, taxpayers should indicate in their requests that a hearing is desired
in the event of no action or of an unfavorable decision.180
To the date of this writing, it is understood that the Internal Revenue
Service has not issued a single Ruling under Revenue Procedure 61-11.111
The lack of action has not been caused by a lack of cases, and one may
wonder whether the delays in acting upon requests for ruling or tech-
nical advice, some of which had reached the National Office as early
as 1959, may be due to the opposition, as a matter of the Treasury policy
manifested in the new association Regulations, to tax equality for pro-
fessionals in retirement planning. While, of course, the Internal Revenue
Service can refuse to rule when action is not "in the interest of sound tax
127. Rev. Proc. 61-11 § 4.01, 1961 CUM. BULL. 897. Cf. Reg. § 601.201(1) (5); Rev.
Proc. 56-12 § 5, 1956-1 CuM. BULL. 1029.
128. Rev. Proc. 61-11 § 4.03, 1961-1 Cum. BULL. 897.
129. Cf. Reg. § 601.201 (1960); Rev. Rul. 54-172, 1954-1 CUM. BULL 394; Rev. Proc.
56-12, 1956-1 Cum. BULL. 1029.
130. Rev. Proc. 61-11 § 4.03, 1961-1 CUM. BULL. 897.
131. The only ruling which, it is believed, has been made by the Internal Revenue Service to
a professional association since promulgation of the new Regulations was issued on March 2,
1961, prior to publication of Revenue Procedure 61-11, to a Connecticut medical clinic, which
had apparently filed its original application on July 10, 1958. Special Ruling, 7 CCH 1961
STAND. FED. TAX REP. 5 6375 (March 27, 1961).
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administration,"' 2 it would seem better administrative practice for the
Service to state publicly that it did not propose to act - favorably or
otherwise - in this area rather than indicate the opposite by the publica-
tion of Revenue Procedure 61-11.13
132. Reg. § 601-201 (a) (1) (1960); Rev. Rul. 54-172 § 2, 1954-1 CUM. BULL. 394.
133. Reference has been made in note 84 above to an article by Boris Bittker, a professor at
Yale Law School, attacking professional association acts, including that of Ohio, as "schemes
for indirectly amending the Internal Revenue Code." Bittker, Professional Associations and
Federal Income Taxation: Some Comments and Questions, 15 TAx L. REv. 1, 30 (1961).
One can assume that Mr. Bittker would also consider the Seventh Circuit's decision for the
Government in Pelton v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936), to be a similar scheme.
